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In the United States, local and state governments have frequently subsidized
sport  tourism developments including stadiums, arenas, marinas, and centers,
with the expectation of substantial economic return on investment. Such pro-
jects are touted for  their  job creation, income generation, tourist  attraction,
and new business stimulation. Beyond the dollars and cents are several social
and political (often understated) reasons for supporting sport tourism projects,
including its “goodness of fit” with the local sport culture, and the overall
(re)development strategy  of  the  city, ability  to  enhance the  destination’s
image, and influence on civic morale and pride. 
A sport facility construction boom has occurred in North America this
decade, financed primarily by tax dollars. For professional football alone, 21 of
the National Football League’s 32 teams have received new or renovated sta-
diums. The average deal is a 323 million U.S. dollar stadium, paid 65 percent by
taxpayers, that  holds  69 200  spectators.  A  common  strategy  used  by  team
owners  to  gain  tax  dollars  for  new  stadiums  is  to  hold  the  team  hostage,
threatening to relocate if their demands are not met. In some cases, owners
move the team for a sweeter deal in another city anyway. Typically, city lead-
ers cave in to the demands, and pay the “ransom” to avoid losing the team. 
As an example, the St. Louis Cardinals baseball team struggled for years
to obtain financial assistance from the city in order to construct a new Busch
Stadium. In June 2001, the Cardinals and the State of Missouri signed a con-
tract to build a new ballpark in downtown St. Louis, adjacent to their old ball-
park, after threats by owners to take the team across the Mississippi River to
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East St. Louis, Illinois. The Busch Stadium is owned by the Cardinals, and was
privately financed using a combination of  private bonds that the Cardinals
were required to repay, bank loans, cash from the owners of the Cardinals and
a long-term loan from St. Louis County. In August 2004, the Cardinals and An-
heuser-Busch agreed on a 20 year contract to keep the Busch Stadium name
alive. Construction of Busch Stadium began in December 2003 with official
groundbreaking ceremonies occurring on January 17, 2004. The stadium was
open for play in April 2006. More information on the Busch Stadium deal may
be found in the appendix of this contribution.
Responding  to  threats  that  the  Naismith  Memorial  Basketball  Hall  of
Fame  might  leave  Springfield  for  Florida,  Massachusetts  House  members
voted  to  provide  25  million  U.S. dollar  to  improve the  sport  attraction. The
threat by officials to relocate the National Basketball Hall of Fame represents
one of the few cases in which officials for a nostalgia-based sport tourism at-
traction used the ransom strategy employed by sport team owners.
Three categories of sport tourists have emerged from previous research:
participatory sport  tourists, sport event tourists, and celebratory sport tour-
ists.1 Participatory sport tourists  and event spectators are easily recognized.
Celebratory sport tourists refer to those who travel to visit places of remem-
brance, view memorabilia and artifacts and/or consume simulated sport ex-
periences. Celebratory sport tourists visit sport halls of fame, stadiums, cruises,
and themed eating and drinking places. While considerable attention has fo-
cused on participatory and event sport tourists, relatively little is known about
celebratory sport tourism development and financing. 
The purpose of this paper is to describe the public financing of selected
celebratory sport tourism attractions in the United States: the Naismith Me-
morial Basketball Hall of Fame, National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing
(NASCAR) Hall of Fame in Charlotte, North Carolina, and the proposed National
Sports Museum in New York. 
Basketball’s New Deal
In 2002, a new National Basketball Hall of Fame with a price tag of more than
45 million U.S. dollar was unveiled in Springfield, Massachusetts. Adjacent to
the old hall, the new museum displays artifacts of the National Basketball As-
1 Cf. Douglas Michele Turco, Roger Riley and Kamilla Swart (2002).
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sociation (NBA) as well as high-tech exhibits. By all accounts, it is a spectacular
structure, both inside and out. A consulting firm estimated that more than
440 000 people  would pass by each year, and more than 300 000 of  them
would stop in to take a look. Construction costs for the new basketball shaped
museum totaled 35.7 million U.S. dollar. Its expanded size doubled the exhibit
space. Much optimism surrounded the Basketball Hall of Fame’s face-lift.
A key component of the project was the development of the properties
surrounding the Hall of Fame. The deal was linked to a 109 million U.S. dollar
riverfront redevelopment plan on 18 acres along the Connecticut River includ-
ing a new Hilton hotel, retail stores, restaurants, a tourist information center, a
children’s museum, and a bikeway along the river. In addition to the 25 million
U.S. dollar in state money to enhance the National Basketball Hall of Fame,
11 million U.S. dollar in private investments were secured. A 17 million U.S. dol-
lar bond was issued to help fund the infrastructure for the site, which included
highway exit ramps and a parking garage. 
Not everyone was keen on the physical placement of the enhanced Na-
tional Basketball Hall of Fame. James A. Aloisi lamented:
“The  most  egregious  example  of  a  botched,  albeit  well-meaning,
development decision is the unfortunate siting of the new Basketball
Hall of Fame, a potential national tourist attraction, on the edge of the
Connecticut River and separated from the downtown by an interstate
highway. Simply put: you cannot walk from the downtown to the Hall
of Fame without significant effort. Visitors to the Hall of Fame have no
feasible  way  to  eat,  shop,  or  do  business  in  the  downtown.  So  the
pattern created by this development is: drive past the downtown, get
off the interstate, tour the facility, get back on the interstate, and leave
town. A wasted opportunity for Springfield.”2
The City of Springfield was awarded a 4 706 000 U.S. dollar loan guarantee un-
der Section 108 to finance the development of the retail and theater compo-
nent of the Basketball Hall of Fame Project. The project is located in the City's
Neighborhood Revitalization Strategy Area owned by the Springfield Redevel-
opment Authority. The project was sold in part because it would benefit low
and moderate-income persons through the creation of 117 jobs, of which 51 per-
2 Cf. James A. Aloisi (2005).
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cent of the jobs were to be held by, or made available to, low and moderate-in-
come persons.
As has happened with other sport development projects, the promises
were too good to be true and soon the reality of low attendance hit Hall of
Fame supporters like a slam dunk in the face. It quickly became apparent that
Hall of Fame attendance was going to be closer to 220 000 to 240 000 yearly
rather than 300 000 to 400 000. To put this in perspective, the national Base-
ball Hall of Fame in Cooperstown, New York has averaged 330 000 visitors per
year for the last decade. Financiers carrying 5 million U.S. dollar in debt from
the old Hall of Fame building, as well as a 10 million U.S. dollar mortgage for
the Hall's new home, took a look at the bottom line and recognized an infusion
of cash was needed quickly. 
Jerry Colangelo, owner of the NBA’s Phoenix Suns, was recruited for the
job, and raised nearly 6 million U.S. dollar in 90 days. He did it by personally
donating 200 000 U.S. dollar, then contacting every team owner in the NBA
and urging them to match it. Jerry Colangelo was rewarded for his efforts by
being inducted into the Hall of Fame as an owner. The retiring debt has since
been pared from 6 million to 2 million U.S. dollar. The museum actually gener-
ated 500 000 U.S. dollar in income last in 2005. 
According to income tax forms filed by the Hall  of Fame in 2004, the
Springfield  Riverfront  Development  Corporation  lost  673 388  U.S.  dollar  in
2003. The Springfield Riverfront Development Corporation recently announced
plans to convert the old Hall of Fame building into a health club complex that
will include a climbing wall, a health rehabilitation center, and a sports bar
and grille. 
The National Basketball Hall of Fame intends to expand on its events, in-
cluding a high school all-star game, appearances by past and present stars, and
its signature weekend, the annual induction ceremony for new Hall of Famers.
Last year, the induction ceremony netted the museum 250 000 U.S. dollar. But
this has not been enough and the Hall of Fame has resorted to several market-
ing ploys to stay afloat, as hosting golf  trade shows, cheerleading competi-
tions, and corporate retreats to keep the revenue stream flowing. The Basket-
ball Hall of Fame has also entered into a partnership with the National Sports
Museum in New York City, with some of its basketball exhibits to be loaned to
the museum for a fee.
In a perfect world, basketball fans would flock to the National Basketball
Hall of Fame on a consistent basis, but at a time when gas prices are climbing,
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attendance for the future is uncertain. On June 30, 2006, Hall of Fame officials
announced  that  they  had  discontinued  its  annual  Tip-Off  Classic  game  on
Thanksgiving weekend, ending a 27-year-old tradition. 
Redesigning the Basketball Hall of Fame was the cornerstone of Spring-
field’s  revitalization  strategy based on  the  planning philosophy  to  go  with
one’s strength. No other city could lay claim to Springfield’s history with bas-
ketball. Springfield’s development strategy used optimism to sway public per-
ception and support for the Hall of Fame renovation. Springfield’s leadership
had to do something – anything – to alter the city’s path of economic and so-
cial  depression. Many sport  development  projects  have been  overpromised,
overvalued, and over budget. Once in operation, many have underachieved. In
the short term, the Basketball Hall of Fame would be placed in this category of
underachievers. 
Before the overhaul, attendance at the Hall of Fame was dwindling, ex-
hibits were stagnant, and the city that hails itself as the birthplace of basket-
ball was close to bankrupt. Even with the new Hall of Fame, the city is still in
financial  disarray,  and  many  residents  in  poverty.  A  quarter  of  the  city’s
152 000 residents live in poverty. Nearly 80 percent of the city’s 459 million U.S.
dollar operating budget is devoted to personnel costs. Springfield is still strug-
gling to right itself under a rescue plan established in 2004 by the state legis-
lature and Governor Mitt Romney. The plan authorized a 52 million U.S. dollar
loan for Springfield and put it under the direction of a financial control board
comprising the mayor, the City Council president and three people appointed
by the governor. Springfield has drawn 22 million U.S. dollar from the loan but
the state froze further draws because it was clear Springfield could not repay
the money by its due date. Springfield’s current budget deficit has been re-
duced to 6.5 million U.S. dollar, down from 41 million U.S. dollar when it ar-
rived.3 
NASCAR Hall of Fame
In March 2006, the NASCAR announced that Charlotte, North Carolina, was se-
lected to be the home of its Hall of Fame. The other two cities at the time of the
announcement that were in the running were Atlanta, Georgia and Daytona
Beach, Florida. The Hall of Fame, which will be located in Charlotte’s Center
3 Cf. Pam Belluck (2006).
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City will be developed, designed, and operated by the City of Charlotte and the
Charlotte Regional Visitors Authority. The total cost of the Hall of Fame is es-
timated at 107.5 million U.S. dollar, and primarily be funded by a new two per-
cent hotel/motel tax and contributions from the State of North Carolina and
the private sector. 
A summary of the financing for the NASCAR Hall of Fame is as follows:
- 102.5 million U.S. dollar in Certificates of Participation (COP) financing
supported  by  the  new  NASCAR Hall  of  Fame  dedicated  2  percent
hotel/motel room occupancy tax
- 20 million U.S. dollar of land value contributed by the State of North
Carolina 
- 13  million  U.S.  dollar  in  COP  financing  supported  by  the  existing
hotel/motel room occupancy tax dedicated to convention center fa-
cilities 
- 2.5 million U.S. dollar in COP financing for the optional four hundred
additional  parking  spaces  supported  by  the  existing  hotel/motel
room occupancy tax dedicated to convention center facilities 
- 5 million U.S. dollar from the State and 6 million U.S. dollar from the
City to reconfigure the South Caldwell Street/I-277 interchange, reim-
bursed to both through sale of excess land 
Hall of Fame officials are quick to note that no property taxes or other general
fund revenues are included in the deal. In addition, the taxes being used (the
existing room occupancy tax dedicated to convention center facilities and the
new 2 percent room occupancy tax associated with the Hall of Fame) are ded-
icated to specific hospitality purposes and are not to be used for general city-
wide purposes such as community safety and transportation.
The Hall of Fame has been designed and conceived by world renowned
architecture  firm, Pei  Cobb  Freed  &  Partners.  The  firm  has  designed  iconic
buildings in cities worldwide, including the Javits Convention Center in New
York City, the expanded Louvre in Paris, the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in Cleve-
land and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D. C.
Design work should continue through 2006, with ground broken in  spring
2007. The NASCAR Hall of Fame is expected to open in late 2009 but no later
than March 31, 2010. 
Charlotte is the hub of the NASCAR industry. Currently 82 percent of NAS-
CAR NEXTEL Cup teams, 72 percent of NASCAR Busch Series teams and 55 per-
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cent of NASCAR Craftsman Truck teams are based in the Charlotte region. The
proposed site is a few miles west of Charlotte Speedway, the site of NASCAR’s
first race. Another factor that helped in the winning bid was the fact that over
half of the total population of the USA was living within a 500-mile radius of
the greater Charlotte region. The racing industry’s current annual statewide
economic impact is estimated to be 5 billion U.S. dollar. 
National Sports Museum
In August 2006, construction is scheduled to start in New York on the 93 mil-
lion U.S. dollar National Sports Museum, with 25 000 feet of interactive exhib-
its, 360-degree immersion theater; one room devoted to college football’s Heis-
man Trophy, and another to the Women’s Sports Foundation’s Hall of Fame,
named after tennis star Billie Jean King. There will be a large area dedicated to
other halls of fame, national governing bodies, and other organizations. The
museum is funded by 36 million U.S. dollar from private investors, 5 million
U.S. dollar in state-issued taxable bonds, and 52 million U.S. dollar in Liberty
Bonds, a federal tax-exempt bond financing program administered by New
York to help revive downtown after the 9/11 tragedy. To reach its profit goals of
at least 20 million U.S. dollar annually, before paying debt service, the museum
will try selling naming rights, and exhibit areas to sponsors. It will also have
significant retail space for lease, a restaurant, and evening event space for up
to 2 500 people. 
Conclusions
Regardless of its direct economic value, real or perceived, losing a sport attrac-
tion can have significant social costs and political consequences, real or per-
ceived. The prospects of losing a major sport attraction signals to others that
the city is a “loser” … and politicians do not want to be losers. Should a major
sport  tourism  attraction  leave,  some  argue  that  businesses  will  leave,  de-
velopers will look elsewhere, civic pride and morale will decline, and creativity
and innovation will  be suppressed. It  is  little  wonder  that  political  leaders,
when faced with an ultimatum from owners, will ante up with public dollars
to retain sport attractions. As noted by Thomas Junod,4 there is an inverted
4 Cf. Thomas Junod (2006).
116 Douglas Michele Turco
Maslow-like pyramid of reasons why public authorities support sport attrac-
tions, from personal  promotion  to  contributing to  the  sustainable  develop-
ment of the city.
In  the  cases  of  the  National  Basketball  Hall  of  Fame,  NASCAR Hall  of
Fame, and National Sport Museum, the economic impacts of these sport tour-
ism attractions on the host cities have been cleverly leveraged by their owners
to gain  public  financing for  development. In  addition, the  impacts  on civic
morale  (social  capital),  and  on  the  destination  identity, image, and  esteem
have also been part of the proposals for public support. The extent to which
these facilities can deliver on their promises has yet to be determined, though
in the short term, the National Basketball Hall of Fame has failed to achieve its
goals to date.
The lodging tax has long been a favorite funding source for tourism de-
velopment projects, including convention  centers  and multipurpose  arenas,
primarily because it allows local politicians to pass the buck to out towners,
shifting the financial burden to visitors. Politicians thus avoid taxpayer revolt
at the ballot box come election day by sticking the bill to outsiders. Lodging
taxes were used to finance in part the three nostalgia-based sport tourism
attractions presented in this paper. It should be noted that there is a down-side
associated with increasing the lodging tax rate to finance tourism develop-
ments. At some point, a city’s high lodging tax rates becomes a deterrent for
trade and exhibition associations to schedule their annual events. A destina-
tion could price itself out of the tourism market with lodging tax rates too far
above the going rate.
More research is needed on the travel behaviors and impacts of celebrat-
ory sport tourists who visit nostalgia-based attractions. Preliminary investiga-
tions  reveal  the  sport  halls  of  fame  are  usually  secondary  attractions  for
overnight visitors (or casuals) and transient excursionists, the latter providing
no  return  on  investment  for  sport  tourism  developments  financed  from
lodging tax revenues. As part of a destination marketing strategy combined
with participatory sport tourism attractions and spectator-based sport events,
sport halls of fame and museums may contribute to a city’s sustained econom-
ic development.
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Appendix
The Busch Stadium Deal, St. Louis, Missouri, USA5
Under an agreement signed at St. Louis City Hall, the St. Louis Cardinals will
build a new publicly owned ballpark adjacent to the current site of Busch Sta-
dium. This will keep the team in downtown St. Louis at least through the 2039
season. The ballpark will be set in a new downtown mixed-use development
planned to include office space, street level shops and restaurants, residential
units, parking, a  new Cardinals  Museum, and a world-class  aquarium. This
new neighborhood will be called Ballpark Village. The total development cost
will be approximately 646 million U.S. dollar. The Cardinals and other private
developers will be responsible for at least two-thirds of the total development
cost. The Cardinals must acquire all of the property necessary for the develop-
ment, with the assistance of the City and state of Missouri if necessary. The
Cardinals will be responsible for completing the ballpark and the entire ball-
park  village  development  including  parking; residential  units;  office  space;
street level commercial and retail space; a baseball museum; and a major en-
tertainment attraction such as a world-class aquarium. The details  of these
projects will be developed in future project agreements. The ballpark, however,
must be sufficiently completed by April 1, 2005, to permit the Cardinals to play
the 2005 baseball  season there. There will  be guarantees, with benchmarks
and milestones, that the ballpark village will be completed. Of the total de-
velopment cost, 346 million U.S. dollar will  build a new ballpark in down-
town St. Louis to accommodate 49 000 fans. The ballpark will be owned by a
public entity, the Sports Center Redevelopment Authority. Thirty percent of the
entire development will be built using minority owned-and women owned-
businesses, consistent  with all  applicable  federal, state  and local  laws, and
with the Mayor’s Executive Order. 
The Cardinals 
The Cardinals will sign a 35-year lease, with three additional five-year options
to play their home games in the new ballpark. The Cardinals will sign a non-
relocation agreement and will agree to pay to the public investors a percent-
5 Source: http://www.cardinals.mlb.com.
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age of any gain resulting from the sale of all or part of the team. The Cardinals
will pay all cost overruns in the construction of the ballpark and will be re-
sponsible for all operating and maintenance expenses, as well as costs for cap-
ital improvements, for the ballpark. The Cardinals will contribute the naming
rights revenues from the ballpark to two separate funds – one benefiting the
state of Missouri and one benefiting the City of St. Louis. These funds will re-
imburse the state and the City if the new revenues generated by the ballpark
fall short of paying for the amounts appropriated by the state and the city. Ex-
cess revenues will go to the Authority. The state of Missouri, St. Louis County
and the City of St. Louis will receive certain marketing, advertising and stadi-
um access rights for  the purpose of  promoting economic development and
tourism. The Cardinals will cap prices on at least 6 000 tickets per game to be
priced at no more than 12 U.S. dollar (as calculated in year 2000 dollars). The
Cardinals will donate at least 100 000 tickets per season to youth and charit-
able organizations throughout the state. In addition, the Cardinals will invest
in recreational facilities to benefit disadvantaged youth in St. Louis City and
St. Louis County. The Cardinals will continue to pay all state and city school
sales taxes as currently assessed. The Cardinals will make annual payments in
lieu of taxes to the St. Louis Board of Education, the City of St. Louis and other
taxing authorities so that the property taxes generated by the development
are no less than the real property taxes paid at Busch Stadium in 2000. 
The City of St. Louis 
The City of St. Louis will invest a portion of the new taxes created at the ball-
park and ballpark village. For 30 years beginning in 2005, the City of St. Louis
will make an annual appropriation of 4.2 million U.S. dollar. This 4.2 million
U.S. dollar will be used for debt service payments on the publicly owned ball-
park, and will capitalize a 60 million U.S. dollar city contribution towards the
ballpark development costs. If the new taxes generated by the project do not
cover the City of St. Louis’ annual appropriation, the City will be reimbursed
from its naming rights fund. The City will have the same lookback intervals
as the state. The City of St. Louis will reduce the special admissions tax on
the gross revenue of all ticket sales in excess of 85 million U.S. dollar a year to
1.5 percent. The City of St. Louis will continue to collect and retain 100 percent
of its share of all other taxes. 
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St. Louis County 
For 30 years, St. Louis County will contribute revenue annually from the ex-
isting County Convention & Recreation Trust Fund. The amount will begin at
2 million U.S. dollar in 2003, and increase by 3 percent each year. That contribu-
tion will capitalize a 40 million U.S. dollar county investment in the ballpark
development. 
State of Missouri 
For 30 years, beginning in July 2005, the state of Missouri will appropriate not
more than 7 million U.S. dollar annually. This amount will capitalize a maxi-
mum state contribution of 100 million U.S. dollar towards the ballpark devel-
opment costs. No state sales tax revenue generated specifically for education
(Proposition  C  –1  percent  sales  tax),  or  conservation  and  natural  resources
(0.025 percent sales tax) will be used to fund the new ballpark. State funding
for the new ballpark will be used for construction purposes only. The state of
Missouri’s appropriation will be based on new sales and withholding tax reve-
nue generated by the stadium project. At no time during the 30-year funding
cycle will the state of Missouri receive less in sales and withholding tax reve-
nues than it did in 1999. After the first seven years, and then every five years
thereafter, the State will determine whether it has received sufficient tax rev-
enues to pay for the annual appropriations made to the stadium project. If, at
any of these look back intervals, the State has received less in new revenue
from taxes than it appropriated for that period, the State will be reimbursed
from its naming rights fund. 
All Parties 
The Governor, the Mayor of the City of St. Louis, the St. Louis County Executive
and the owners of the St. Louis Cardinals agree to use their absolute best ef-
forts to obtain passage of all legislation necessary to make this redevelopment
a reality. 
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